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Abstract: The paper develops a three-sector, specific factor, general equilibrium model
with two high-skill sectors and unemployment of skilled labour. One of the two high-skill
sectors produces a non-traded commodity whose aggregate demand consists of both
domestic demand and an exogenously given foreign demand. The consequences of a
decline in the foreign demand for the non-traded good resulting from worldwide
economic recession on the skilled and unskilled labour markets in a developing economy
have been examined. The analysis finds that the effects on the labour markets crucially hinge
on the relative factor intensities of the two high-skill sectors and that through adoption of
appropriate fiscal measures; the country can shield its workforce from the rage of global
economic downturn.
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1. Introduction
The financial and economic crisis that started in 2008 has deep implications for
employment across the world. While the precise consequences cannot be predicted, it
appears certain that both jobs and wage levels would suffer in many developing
countries. The crisis is underscoring the relevance of the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda. As
per the annual Global Employment Trends report (2009) of the ILO the global economic
crisis could result in an additional 18 million unemployed in the world and increased
levels of vulnerable people in employment.
The economic crisis that originated in developed countries affects the developing
economies in a number of ways. The fall in the imports of the developed nations from
developing countries has spelt gloom. Consequent decline in commodity prices have
resulted in lower export earnings, which left the latter countries high and dry. Developing
countries which depend on primary and processed products are hit hard. Countries like
India and China that are large exporters of high-skill commodities like computer software
are facing serious problem due to decreased demand from developed countries resulting
in lower prices for these products. For India, it is even a bigger problem because India is
the land of IT outsourcing and a lot of large western companies outsource their IT
services to Indian companies. So, it is obvious that the supply of works for Indian
outsourcing companies will suffer until the crisis gets over.
On the other hand, during economic downturns migrant workers in the developed nations
are often the first to lose their jobs and while some may well choose to return home,
policies aimed at sending migrant workers home tend to be based on the perception that
“migrants take jobs” or “compete for welfare benefits”. More restrictive immigration
policies are being adopted to protect the local labour market and in response to a demand
for fewer foreign workers.  For example, a reduction in the number of migrants to be
3admitted for employment has already been announced in some countries (Italy, U.K.) or
is under discussion in others (e.g. U.S. and Australia).  In Spain, the Government has
introduced financial incentives to encourage unemployed migrants to return home. Such
protectionist policies on the part of the rich nations accentuate the miseries of the
developing economies.
Under the circumstances, the present paper is designed to examine the consequences of
economic slump on both skilled and unskilled labour markets in a developing economy1
in terms of a three-sector general equilibrium model with two high-skill sectors and a
low-skill informal sector.2 One of the two high-skill sectors produces a non-traded
commodity and skilled workers receive their efficiency wage. The latter gives rise to the
phenomenon of skilled unemployment. On the other hand, unskilled workers in the
informal sector3 receive the competitive wage. The informal wage is completely flexible
so that the unskilled labour market always clears.4 We formalize economic recession in
1
 This problem has not so far been adequately addressed in the theoretical literature on trade and
development. Marjit, Kar and Chaudhuri (2010) is, of course, a notable exception where it is
shown that economic downturn in the high-skill sector may in fact increase the real informal
unskilled wage. The paper, however, has considered a full-employment model and does not
address issues like skilled unemployment and consequence of the problem on the economic well-
being of the working class as a whole which are quite important from the view point of
policymaking.
2 The Unskilled labour market in a developing economy is imperfect and there is formal-informal
sector segmentation. In the formal sector unskilled workers are organized and receive a higher
unionized wage than what their counterparts receive in the informal sector of the economy. The
unskilled workers who are unable to get employment in the formal sector are automatically
absorbed in the informal sector. We, however, do not include a low-skill formal sector in our
model as its inclusion cannot affect our main results in a big way.
3
 There is a vast theoretical literature that discusses various aspects of the informal sector in a
developing economy. This includes works of Chaudhuri and Banerjee (2007), Marjit (2003),
Chaudhuri et al. (2006), Chaudhuri (2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006 a,b, 2007, 2010 a,b,c),
Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2002 a, b), Chaudhuri and Dwibedi (2007), Chaudhuri and
Yabuuchi (2010) etc.
4 In reality, the informal sector and open unemployment of unskilled labour coexist. This happens
if the informal sector unskilled wage is also rigid in the downward direction. However, we do not
4the high-skill sector as follows. The price of the non-traded high-skill commodity is
determined by demand-supply forces with total demand for the good being equal to domestic
demand (which depends on relative commodity prices and national income) and exogenously
given foreign demand. Economic recession is then captured through a reduction in foreign
demand for the non-traded commodity that causes its price to fall and the sector to contract. If this
sector happens to be less (more) intensive in the use of capital (skilled labour) relative to the other
high-skill sector the aggregate demand for skilled labour falls. This leads to a reduction in skilled
wage and an increase in the unemployment of skilled labour. The consequences of economic
recession on the informal unskilled wage and welfare of the workers (skilled plus unskilled) in
terms of Sen’s (1974) welfare measure have also been studied. We find that most of the above
effects crucially hinge on the relative factor intensities of the two high-skill sectors.
Notwithstanding the initial effects, the analysis shows that through adoption of appropriate fiscal
measures, the country can shield its workforce (both skilled and unskilled) from the fury of global
economic downturn.
2. The Model
We consider a small open economy consisting of three sectors: a low-skill informal
sector and two high-skill sectors. The low-skill sector (sector 1) produces a primary
exportable commodity by using unskilled labour and capital. Sector 2 is the services
sector that produces a non-traded high-skill product (services) by means of skilled labour
and capital. Finally, sector 3 produces an internationally traded high-skill commodity like
computer software with the help of skilled labour and capital. So, unskilled labour is
specific to sector 1. Skilled labour is mobile between sector 2 and sector 3 while capital is
consider unemployment of unskilled labour because in an economy the possibility of being
unemployed also rises with increasing education and skills. In the case of India, NSSO surveys
conducted over the years show that the unemployment rate among those educated above the
secondary level was higher, in both rural and urban areas, than those with lesser educational
attainments. The NSSO 61st Round report, Employment and Unemployment Situation in India
2004-05, attributes this to the fact that “the job seekers become gradually more and more
choosers as their educational level increases.” Serneels (2007) also has found that in Ethiopia
unemployment is concentrated among relatively well-educated first time job seekers who come
from the middle classes.
5perfectly mobile among all the three sectors of the economy. There is unemployment of
skilled labour in the society which is explained by using the wage efficiency hypothesis
(WEH). The efficiency function of skilled labour is a simplified version of that available
in Agell and Lundborg (1992, 1995).5 This function can be derived from the effort norm
of the skilled workers, which is sensitive to both the skilled wage and the skilled
unemployment rate. Production functions exhibit constant returns to scale with positive
and diminishing marginal productivity to each factor. The prices of the traded
commodities are given internationally while the price of the non-traded good (commodity
2) is determined domestically by demand and supply forces. The demand for the non-
traded good consists of both domestic demand which depends on relative commodity
price and national income and an exogenously given foreign demand. Finally, commodity
1 is chosen as the numeraire.
The following symbols will be used for formal presentation of the model.
Kia   amount of capital required to produce 1 unit of output in the ith sector, i  1,2,3;
Lia unskilled labour-output ratio in sector 1;
Sia  skilled labour-output ratio in the ith sector, i  2,3;
3P  exogenously given relative price of the commodity 3;
2P  endogenously determined price of the non-traded high-skill commodity (good 2);
iX level of output of the i th sector, i  1,2,3;
h  efficiency of each skilled worker;
SW wage rate of skilled labour;
SW
h
wage rate per efficiency unit of skilled labour;
W competitive wage rate of unskilled labour in sector 1;
5
 Interested readers may check that the qualitative results of the model do not change much even
if we allow the effort norm of skilled workers to depend on the functional distribution of income
of different factors of production. However, we do not consider this case because it would
unnecessarily complicate the algebra. In this connection, one may look at Chaudhuri and
Banerjee (2010a, b) for a general treatment of the WEH.
6r  return to capital;
D exogenously given foreign demand for commodity 2;
2D   aggregate demand (domestic plus foreign) for the non-traded commodity;
L  endowment of unskilled labour;
S  endowment of skilled labour (in physical unit);
v  unemployment rate of skilled labour;
K  economy’s capital stock (given exogenously;
ji distributive share of the j th input in the i th sector for j , ,L S K  and i  1, 2, 3;
ji proportion of the j th input employed in the i th sector for j ,S K and i 1,2,3;
 '' proportional change.
2.1. Determination of the efficiency wage of skilled labour
Skilled workers in the two high-skill sectors (sector 2 and sector 3) receive the efficiency
wage. We assume that the effort norms of the skilled labour depend positively on both (i)
skilled wage; and, (ii) the unemployment rate of skilled labour.6 Therefore, we write
( , )Sh h W v (1)
The efficiency function satisfies the following mathematical restrictions:
1 2, , 0h h  ; 11 0h  ; 12 0h  .⁭7
The unit cost of skilled labour in sector 2 and sector 3, denoted by  , is given by
( )(.)
SW
h
  (2)
6
 See footnotes 5 and 7 in this context.
7
 Mathematical derivation of the efficiency function from the optimizing behavior of a
representative rational skilled worker and explanations of the mathematical restrictions on the
partial derivatives are available in Agell and Lundborg (1992, 1995). Also see Chaudhuri and
Banerjee (2008) in this context.
7Each firm in sector 2 and sector 3 minimizes its unit cost of skilled labour as given by
(2). The first-order condition of minimization is
1Sh W h (3)
where 1h is the partial derivative of the efficiency function with respect to SW . Equation
(3) can be rewritten as
1 1E  (3.1)
where 1E is the elasticity of the (.)h function with respect to SW . This is the well-known
Solow condition as found in the efficiency wage literature.
Solving equation (3.1) we obtain SW as a negative function ofv . We, therefore, have
' 2
11
( ); ( ) ( ) 0SS S S
S
W hW W v W
v W h
    (note that 11 0h  .) (4)
The optimum efficiency of each skilled worker is given by
* *( ( ), )
             (+)(-)(+)
Sh h W v v (5)
From (5) it is clear that the skilled unemployment rate, v , produces two opposite effects
on the optimum efficiency, *h . For determining the net effect totally differentiating (5)
we get
1 2* ( )S
Wdh h dv h dv
v
 
Using (4) and simplifying we obtain8
2
1 11
11
*( ) ( )( )
              (+)(-)
S
S
hdh h W h
dv W h
 
  (note that 1 110; 0h h  ) (6)
8
 The sign of *( )dh
dv
depends on the sign of 1 11( )Sh W h which in turn depends on the specific
algebraic form of the efficiency function.
82.2. The general equilibrium
Given the perfectly competitive commodity markets the three price-unit cost equality
conditions relating to the three industries are as follows.
1 1 1L KWa ra  (7)
2 2 2( )
*
S
S K
W
a ra P
h
  (8)
3 3 3( )
*
S
S K
W
a ra P
h
  (9)
Full utilization of unskilled labour and capital, respectively, imply
1 1La X L (10)
1 1 2 2 3 3K K Ka X a X a X K   (11)
There is unemployment of skilled labour in the economy and the rate of unemployment is
.v  The skilled labour endowment equation is, therefore, given by
2 2 3 3 (1 ) *S Sa X a X v h S   (12)
The aggregate factor income9 in the economy is given by
(1 )SY WL W v S rK    (13)
where WL , (1 )SW v S and rK stand for aggregate unskilled wage, skilled wage and rental
income on capital, respectively.
Commodity 2 is a non-traded high-skill product (services). The aggregate demand for this
commodity ( 2D ) consists of both domestic demand and foreign demand. The foreign
demand is exogenously given at D while the domestic demand depends negatively and
9
 This is also the national income at domestic (or world) prices as there are no tariffs and/or
subsidies.
9positively on the relative price of the commodity ( 2P ) and aggregate factor income (Y ),
respectively.10 We, therefore, write
2 2 2( , )D D P Y D  (14)
In equilibrium, the aggregate demand for commodity 2 is equal to its supply ( 2X ). Hence
in equilibrium we have
2 2 2( , )D P Y D X  (15)
In this general equilibrium set-up we have eleven endogenous variables -
2 2 1 2, , , *, , , , , ,SW W r h P v D Y X X and 3X  and the same number of independent equations;
namely equations (4), (5) and (7) – (15). *, , , Sh v W W and r are obtained as functions
of 2P from equations (4), (5) and (7) – (9). Once factor prices are known factor-
coefficients ( jia s) are also obtained as functions of 2P . Y and 2D are found from (13) and
(14) while 1 2,X X and 3X are solved as functions of 2P from (10) – (12). Finally, 2P is
obtained from (15).
As sector 2 and sector 3 use two common inputs, skilled labour and capital, they together
form a Heckscher-Ohlin subsystem (HOSS) and can be classified in terms of factor
intensities. However, we do not want to make factor intensity rankings of these two
sectors at this stage. We would like to show how most of the results crucially hinge on
the relative factor intensities of the two high-skill sectors.
10
 The relative price of commodity 3 i.e. 3P is also an argument in 2D . But we do not explicitly
include it in the demand function as it is given internationally.
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3. Consequences of Economic Recession
In this section we are going to examine the consequences of economic recession in the
skilled sector on the two labour markets. An economic recession in the skilled labour
market is here captured through a decrease in the exogenous foreign demand for the non-
traded high-skill commodity ( D ). A decrease in D  affects the price of this commodity
( 2P ) which in turn affects all the endogenous variables.
3.1 Effects on factor prices and aggregate factor income
For examining the consequences of a drop in D  on the endogenous variables after totally
differentiating equations (4), (5) and (7) – (9), using (4) and (5) and solving by using the
Cramer’s rule one can derive the following expressions.
2 3
2ˆˆ ( )
*
Sh vr P
h

 
3
2ˆˆ ( )Kv P

 
2 1 3
2
1
ˆ ˆ( )
*
K S
L
h vW P
h
 
 
2 3
22
11
ˆ ˆ( )KS
S
h vW P
W h

  (16.1)
2 3
1 11 2
11
ˆ ˆ* ( )( )
*
K
S
S
h vh h W h P
h W h

  
2 3
2
ˆˆ ˆ( *) ( )
*
K
S
h vW h P
h

 
where 2 2 3 3 2( )S K S KE      ; and,
2
2 ( ) 0
*
h vE
h
   is the elasticity of *(.)h with respect to v . (16.2)
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Again differentiating equations (10) – (12) and solving we can also obtain the following
expressions.
2
2 3 1 3 2
ˆˆ ( )[ ]S K
PX A A   
2
3 2 1 2 2
ˆˆ ( )[ ]S K
PX A A   (17.1)
where: 1 1 2 33 121 2 3
1
( )[( )( ) ]
*
S K
KL LK K KS K KS
L
h vA S S S S
h
        ;
2 3 2 1 112
2 2 3 3
11
(1( )[( )( ) {( ) }]
* 1 *
S
S SK S SK K
S
h h W hhvA S S
h v h W h
  
    ; and, (17.2)
2 3 3 2( )K S K S      .
Here kjiS  is the degree of substitution between factors in sector k . For example,
1 1
1
( )( )LLL
L
aWS
a W
  ,
1 1
1
( )( )LLK
L
arS
a r
  etc. 0
k
jiS  for j i ; and, 0kjjS  .
Differentiating (13), using (16.1) and simplifying one can find
3 2
ˆ ˆY A P (18.1)
where: 1 3 23 3
1
( )[( )
*
K S
S K
L
h WLvA W S
Y h
    
2
3 3 11
11
( ){ *(1 ) }]
*
K S S
S
h h v S rK W h
W h h
    (18.2)
Differentiation of (14) yields
2 2 2
2
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ( )P Y
DD E P E Y D
D
   (19)
where 2 22
2 2
( ) 0P
D PE
P D
  ; and,
2
2
( ) 0Y
D YE
Y D
  are the own price and income
elasticities of the non-traded good, respectively.
Using (18.1) equation (19) may be rewritten as follows.
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2 2 3 2
2
ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( )P Y
DD E A E P D
D
   (20)
For Walrasian static stability in the market for the non-traded good (commodity 2) we
need
2 2
2 2
ˆ ˆ
( ) ( ) 0ˆ ˆ
D X
P P
    (21.1)
where
3 1 3 2
2 3
( )[( ) ] 0S KP Y
A AE A E  
     (21.2)
Differentiation of the equilibrium condition in the market good 2 i.e. equation (15), use of
(17.1), (20) and (21.2) and simplification lead to the following result.
2
2
ˆ
( ) [( ) / ] 0ˆ
                        (-)
P D
DD
    (22)
Using equations (21.2) and (22) from (17.1) it then follows that
2
3 1 3 2
2
ˆ
( ) ( )[ ] 0ˆ S K
X D A A
DD
    ; and,
3
2 2 2 1
2
ˆ
( ) ( )[ ] 0ˆ K S
X D A A
DD
     (23)
The above results can be summarized in terms of the following proposition.
Proposition 1: A drop in the foreign demand for the non-traded good resulting from
economic recession leads to (i) an unambiguous decrease in the price of the commodity;
and, (ii) a contraction (an expansion) of sector 2 (sector 3).
The intuitive explanations of these results are fairly straightforward. A fall in the
exogenously given foreign demand results in a decrease in the aggregate demand for
good 2 which lowers its price, 2P , given the supply. A fall in 2P  then produces a Stolper-
13
Samuelson effect and a consequent Rybczynski effect in the HOSS thereby leading to a
contraction of sector 2 and an expansion of sector 3. These results are independent of the
factor intensity rankings of the two high-skill sectors.
Besides, from (16.1), (16.2), (18.1), (18.2), (21.2) and (22) the following proposition can
be established.11
Proposition 2: If sector 3 is more capital-intensive relative to the non-traded sector
(sector 2) a decrease in the autonomous foreign demand for the non-traded commodity
leads to (i) decreases in both skilled and unskilled wages; and, (ii) increases in both return
to capital and skilled unemployment rate. Besides, the policy lowers the aggregate factor
income of the economy if additionally 3
3
( ) [ ](1 )
K
S
a K
a v S
  where
11
1
( ) 0SW h
h
    is the
elasticity of the 1(.)h function with respect to SW .
In proposition 1 we have seen that a decrease in D lowers the price of the non-traded
commodity, 2P and a contraction of sector 2. Now if sector 2 is less (more) capital-
intensive (skilled labour-intensive) vis-à-vis sector 3 the skilled wage falls and the return
to capital rises due to the Stolper-Samuelson effect. The aggregate demand for skilled
labour falls as the skilled labour-intensive sector contracts. This raises the unemployment
rate of skilled labour. The expanding capital-intensive sector (sector 3) requires more
capital which is released by both sector 2 and sector 1.⁭12 consequently, sector 1 also
contracts and the competitive unskilled wage falls. The aggregate wage income of both
types of labour falls but the rental income on capital rises. So there are two opposite
effects on the aggregate factor income. Our analysis shows that the aggregate factor
income falls if additionally the capital-skilled labour ratio in sector 3 is not less than a
11
 These results have been proved in Appendix I.
12
 As the capital-intensive sector (sector 3) expands at the cost of the skilled labour-intensive
sector (sector 2), the aggregate demand for capital in the HOSS increases. In other words, the
capital released by the contracting sector 2 is inadequate for the expansion of sector 3. The
remaining amount of extra capital must, therefore, come from sector 1.
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critical value (see proposition 2). However, the consequences on different factor prices
and aggregate factor income are completely opposite if sector 2 is more (less) capital-
intensive (skilled labour-intensive) vis-à-vis sector 3.
4. Effect of economic recession on welfare of workers
We are now going to analyze the effect of economic recession in the skilled sector on the
welfare of the workers. There are two types of worker in the economy: skilled and
unskilled. We assume that workers are the owners of capital and that the capital income is
equally received by the workers13 (both skilled and unskilled). There are three income
groups in the economy: unskilled workers, employed skilled workers and unemployed
skilled workers. The income distribution of the different working groups is given as
follows.
                      Income
(wage income plus capital income): [ ( )]rKW
L S
  [ ( )]S
rKW
L S
  [( )]
rK
L S
Employment: L (1 )v S vS
After normalizing the aggregate labour endowment (skilled plus unskilled) to unity we
write
( ) 1S L  (24)
As the incomes of the different groups of worker differ, there is a positive Gini-
coefficient,G , of the income distribution of the workers.
The welfare measure of Sen (1974), defined as the per-capita income multiplied by one
minus the Gini-coefficient of the income distribution, is an appropriate measure of
13
 This is a simplifying assumption. The welfare analysis becomes extremely complicated if the
owners of capital (capitalists) are considered as a separate group of income earning people.
Besides, Gupta (1994), Chaudhuri (2000) and Dwibedi and Chaudhuri (2010) have also made this
assumption on different contexts.
15
welfare of the workers. LetV be the social welfare measure of Sen (1974) which is given
as follows.
(1 )V y G  (25)
where y is the average wage income of all workers. From (13) after using (24) we note
that
[ (1 ) ]Sy WL W v S rK    (26)
Also (1 ) ( ) (1 )S SyG v SL W W v SvSW LvSW      (27)
Using (26) and (27) and simplifying from (25) we can write
2[1 ( 2 )] [1 (1 )]SV W S S vL rK W S v L       (28)
Differentiating (28) the following proposition can be proved.14
Proposition 3: A drop in exogenous demand for the non-traded high-skill commodity
resulting from economic recession lowers welfare of the workers if (i) 0  ; (ii)1 2v ;
and, (iii)
2
3
3 2
(1 )( ) ( )S
K
a vS L
a E K
 . On the contrary, if the non-traded sector is more capital-
intensive relative to the other high-skill sector and conditions (ii) and (iii) hold welfare of
the workers improves.
5. Policy implications of results and concluding remarks
The recent economic recession though originated in developed countries, has affected the
economies of many developing countries as well. India is by no means an exception.
Rates of economic growth have fallen sharply and massive job losses and increasing
poverty are all shaking the economic foundation of these countries. The developed
countries have desperately fallen back upon monetary and fiscal measures for getting out
of the crises. Besides, in a bid to protect domestic jobs they have laid off numerous
migrant workers and restricted the entry of new skilled migrants into their territories. This
14
 See Appendix II.
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protectionist policy on the part of developed nations adds to the dismay of the developing
countries. In this backdrop this paper has examined the implications of economic
recession in the high-skill sector on the wellbeing of the different groups of worker in a
developing economy in terms of a three-sector general equilibrium model with two high-
skill sectors.15 One of the two high-skill sectors produces a non-traded commodity the
aggregate demand for which consists of both domestic and foreign demand. There is
unemployment of skilled labour in the model which has been explained by using the
wage efficiency hypothesis. A reduction in the foreign demand for the non-traded
commodity resulting from worldwide economic recession not only depresses the two
wages and national income but also raises the unemployment of skilled labour in the case
where the non-traded high-skill sector is less (more) capital-intensive (skilled labour-
intensive) vis-à-vis the other high-skill sector (sector 3). Also this is likely to affect
welfare of the working community adversely. On the contrary, if the non-traded sector is
capital-intensive all the above results are likely to get reversed. The developed countries
have already resorted to protectionist measures to safeguard the interest of their workers.
There is no reason, therefore, as to why the developing economies should not also
undertake protectionist policies to care for the interest of their workforce. If initially the
non-traded sector (sector 2) is less capital-intensive relative to sector 3, the government
should resort to a capital subsidy policy to sector 2 and/or impose a tax on the use of
capital in sector 3 so as to increase the capital intensity of production in sector 2.⁭16
15
 This analytical structure may also be useful in examining the consequence of economic
recession on the relative wage inequality in the developing world. There is, however, a vast
theoretical literature that explains the widening of the skilled-unskilled wage inequality in the
developing countries during the liberalized economic regime. This consists of works like
Chaudhuri (2008), Chaudhuri (2004), Chaudhuri and Yabuuchi (2007, 2008), Beladi, Chaudhuri
and Yabuuchi (2008), Yabuuchi and Chaudhuri (2009, 2007) etc. However, none of these papers
has discussed the outcome of worldwide economic downturn on the relative wage inequality.
16
 A capital subsidy policy to sector 2 makes capital relatively cheaper which in turn induces the
producers in sector 2 to substitute skilled labour by capital. As a result, the production technique
in this sector becomes more capital-intensive than before. On the other hand, a tax on the use of
capital in sector 3 lowers the capital intensity of production. There exist critical values of the
subsidy and tax rates such that any further increases in these rates completely reverse the factor
17
These fiscal policies, if undertaken appropriately, are expected to result in an unequivocal
improvement in the wellbeing of the working population and protect them from the wrath
of global economic meltdown.
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Appendix I: Effects of economic recession on factor prices and aggregate factor
income
Using (16.1), (16.2), (21.2) and (22) and simplifying the following results can be
obtained.
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Similarly, using (22) and simplifying from equations (18.1), (18.2) and (21.2) we find
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1
( ) 0SW h
h
    is the elasticity of the 1(.)h function with respect to SW .
From (A.2)  it, therefore, follows that
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Appendix II: Effect of economic recession on V
Differentiating equation (28) we get
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Besides, using (A.1) from (A.4) one finds
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Using (A.7) equation (A.4) can be rewritten as follows.
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Using (A.1) and simplifying from (A.8) we finally obtain
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From (A.9) we find that
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